Last Monday was the first day of the year 2024. It was a holiday. I wanted to play golf, but my home course, Pueblo Golf and Country Club, was closed. Instead of Netflix-bingeing, I opted to consult the “Oracle of Delphi.”

What is in store for the Muslim Autonomous Region in the year 2024? The following are the conjectures I got from the seer that played in my mind. As a caveat, these are all Nostradamus-like predictions that may or may not happen. They are dependent on the interplay of a myriad of variables. This guesswork is, however, a product of our critical observation of past events. Readers have to take them with a grain of salt.

After the show of support by the national government capped by the categorical pronouncement in the State of the Nation Address, the leadership of the BARMM consolidated its powers. Its political stock amplified.  It transferred the seat of the BARMM government to Parang, Maguindanao, which is the home and base of operations of the MILF, which now runs the autonomous government.

Another gesture of support was the designation of Senior Minister Abdulrauf Macacua as interim governor of the newly created province of Maguindanao del Norte. We will see in 2024 more moves by the leaders of BARMM designed to serve its political interest and strengthen its hold on the leadership of the regional government.

A major shake-up in the BARMM cabinet, like the recent one, signals every BARMM official to shape up or ship out. This augurs well for the stakeholder Moros. That development always puts the BARMM officials on their toes and reminds them to deliver the services the stakeholders deserve. It is no longer business as usual. We expect an improvement in government services this year.

The anxiety over and the preparations for the 2025 elections will dominate the political air. It will be the domineering consideration, if not an obfuscating factor, for whatever policies the BARMM-MILF leadership will map out for the year. The filing of certificates of candidacy is less than a year from today. Most policy decisions will be molded in that direction. We predict intense politicking and skirmishes between the Bangsamoro Governors Caucus and Camp Darapanan, the de facto seat of the BARMM. Their “cold war” will step up.

The fear of losing their grip on power, not to mention the perks, privileges, and adulation that they enjoy, will force the present BARMM-MILF leadership to dig deeper for the logic to justify the extension of their terms of office without elections.

Their gut feeling is they would lose in any electoral confrontation with the dynastic governors. They are not yet prepared for that. They offer a “moral governance,” their mantra, as an alternative to the dynastic governance of the governors, but the Moro in the street is lackadaisical. While their victory in the Cotabato City polls, which is their “home court,” and the ascension of Senior Minister Abdulraof Macacua indicate their exponential political influence, they need something more to fight the political dynasts.

We will see the BARMM leadership lobby again, ad nauseam, in the year 2024 onward to the first quarter of 2025 for the postponement of the elections. Their default refrain, which has become predictable, will be the non-completion of the normalization process after the peace accord with the government.

They can always claim that the government has not fulfilled so much in the peace contract, like the delivery of the benefits package that will transform the rebels and the rebel camps into progressive communities and the incomplete integration of the mujahideens into the AFP and PNP.

They can also claim that the Interim Bangsamoro Transitory Authority did not complete the transition process because of the failure to enact and pass some organic codes and policies to make autonomy fully operational. But these are rehashed arguments. As Filipinos are wont to say: “Bumenta na yan (That is overused).”

I leave it to my readers to comment on the arguments of the BARMM leadership.

amb_mac_lanto@yahoo.com